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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
S'TATE. OF UTAH 
KIMBALL ELEVATOR COMPANY, 
INC., a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
ELEVATOR SUPPLIES COMPANY, 
INC., a corporation, 
Defendant and Ap~pellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
8066 
This is an action between an elevator company and 
an elevator parts supplier. 
The record of facts and circumstances surrounding 
the issues is rather voluminous due to the long course of 
dealings between the parties out of which the cause of 
action arose. 
The plaintiff, Kimball Elevator Company, has oper-
ated in Utah since 1922, first as an individual or partner-
ship and later as a corporation (R. 228). It main-
tained a business association with the defendant, Eleva-
tor Supplies Company, which may be seen at the Medical 
Arts Building, Salt Lake City, March 2, 1926, and with 
the rnstalla tion of three passenger eleva tors at Hotel 
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Utah, Salt Lake City, in 1930 (R .. 230). These instal-
lations made by the plaintiff company, included a flash-
light signal system and night bell furnished by the 
defendant (R. 230, 269). On the Hotel Utah and the 
Medical Arts, as on all other elevator p-rojects, the de-
fendant quoted on certain equipment to the plaintiff and 
the plaintiff installed or performed the elevator work 
(R. 271). 
THE F:ACTS 
Thus, from 1926 the plaintiff did business with the 
defendant· corporation, purchased elevator supplies in 
the defendant's line of manufacture, and on jobs of any 
size conferred at the job site with Mr. Roy C. Smith, the 
defendants area district 1nanager (R. 272). 
World War II caused n1aterial shortages in n1any 
phases of our domestic economy. The ·elevator business 
was not excepted. One of the consequences was an 
attempt by many buildings to keep obsolete or worn 
machines in sufficient repair to operate until a con1plete 
overhaul or "modernization" could be secured and the 
latest safety features installed. 
Elevator "modernizations" are designed to increase 
speed and safety of operation. The hand lever, controlled 
by an operator, for starting, speed of movement and_ 
stopping, is not seen in a modern type. Instead, the pas-
senger~ .entering the elevator call out their floors. The 
operator pushes corresponding buttons on the operating 
panel. As the car rises it stops automatically at each 
of these floors, the doors opening of thernselves as the 
elevato~, reaches exactly the level of the floor. On the 
other h·and a. person on an upper floor may signal an 
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approaching elevator. By pressing a button he registers 
the nu1nber of his floor and the car stops automatically 
'vithout the aid of the operator. The operator has nothing 
to do but close doors for it is the closing of the doors 
"Thich releases the starting 1nechanism and starts the 
car auton1atically. 
Following the close of the War and the lifting of 
1naterial restrictions, new construction surged and every 
ntajor hotel and public service building in the inter-
Inountain country considered plans to "modernize" its 
passenger elevators. The plaintiff and the defendant 
co1npanies worked together to secure this business. The 
plaintiff company acted as the original contractor taking 
responsibility for elevator renovation and the overall 
job. The defendant company, a supplier as its very name 
designates it to be, furnished and proposed to furnish 
to the plaintiff certain relay, signal and other electrical 
equip1nent. The defendant corporation has never acted 
as an original contractor until Septe1nber 27, 1950, when 
it contracted to repair the elevators at the Hotel Utah, 
under contract pTice $79,27 4.00, later increased to $85,-
554.00 (R. 235-256). 
Defendant did not manufacture the Inaster controls 
'vhich operate the hoisting motors, it furnished relay con-
trols - commonly referred to as the signal system and 
trade named "synchron control," "collective- selective," 
"duplux selective," etc. The relay system registered all 
passenger calls from hall buttons on a relay panel, which 
transferred or relayed the call to the "controls" which 
reduce the speed as the elevator entered th·e zone of the 
call ( R. 27 4) . 
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A complete job required control equipn1ent beyond 
the signal systems engineered by the defendant con1pany. 
Therefore plaintiff purchased the necessary control panel 
from other elevator companies, such as 1Iurphy Elevator 
Company, whose representatives were introduced to 
plaintiff by defendant (R. 276) because the relay con-
trol manufactured by defendant worked in conjunction 
with the control panel manufactured by ~Iurphy Elevator 
Company (R. 274-275). 
In keeping with the arrange1nent of the three com-
panies, defendant would furnish the signal relay equip-
ment, Murphy Elevator Company the controls, l{ilnball 
the elevator work, thereby being able to compete ·with 
any company in the field (R. 280), and whereby proposals 
were made to various and innumerable buildings and 
firms. 
Not only were negotiations made through formal 
written proposals but also by word of mouth with build-
ing management and representatives. Mr. Roy C. Sn1ith, 
district manager of the Elevator Supplies Company, fre-
quently accompanied Daniel W. Connole, plaintiff's 
manager, to the job sites and on some occasions talked 
elevators with the building owners or engineers. To-
gether with Connole, R.oy C. Smith visited the ~Iedical 
Arts Building, Salt Lake City (R. 282-283), and as sho,vn 
by Exhibit "R", in April of 1946, at the instance of the 
plaintiff, one of the men1bers of the Board of Directors 
of the Medical Arts Building while in San FTancisco, 
California, was shown various relay control systems in 
operation, in which equipment furnished by defendant 
had been installed (R. 284). As shown by the evidence 
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pre~ented to the Court and jury (Exh. "Y", R. 294), Roy 
C. S1nith of the defendant conferred with plaintiff in 
regard to the visit to San Francisco of the member of the 
board of directors of Medical Arts Building . 
.. A.t no time did the plaintiff company receive or 
request quotations on systems competitive to that fur-
nished by the defendant (R. 302-303). 
The Synchron System of Elevator Supplies was 
further explained at Salt Lake City to the board of direc-
tors of the Medical Arts Building by Mr. Connole of the 
respondent company and Mr. Roy C. Smith of the appel-
lant company, both orally and by "cuts" or illustrations 
(R .. 285), as to the efficient manner in which this system 
would handle passengers in the elevators, as proposed 
(Exh. "S"). 
Alma J. Janke, managing engineer at the Medical 
Arts Building, stated that he became acquainted with 
Roy C. Smith of defendant company (R. 444) when Smith 
would drop into the Medical Arts Building with Connole. 
It "\Vas then contemplated that the elevators would be 
modernized and the job was discussed (R. 445). Mr. 
Connole suggested that Janke go to New York and Louis-
ville, Kentucky to see defendant's synchron control equip-
ment. Later, following his trip, Janke stated the equip-
ment "\Vas installed under Mr. Connole's supervision (R. 
417). 
At the same time the Murphy Elevator Company 
was also quoting Kimball on the price of the material it 
would furnish (Exh. "T" and "U", R. 289). 
Upon receipt of the data from the Elevator Supplies 
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Company and the incorporation of all estimates the plain-
tiff 1nade its proposal, June 28 1947 to the Medical Arts 
' ' Building for the modernization of two elevators and the 
supply of one new and complete machine (Exh. "V", R. 
290). Plaintiff secured the job, supervised the completion 
of the installation and Kimball thresholq na1ne plates 
were installed upon the cabs (Exh. "W", R. 291). 
Later Mr. Connole and Mr. Roy C. Sn1ith brought 
Jerry Smith of the Hotel Utah over to the l\1:edical Arts 
Building to see the job in operation (R .. 449). Janke 
stated that there had been some discussions between hhn, 
Mr. Connole and Mr. Roy C. Smith of the defendant that 
he would be employed in installing equipment at the hotel 
if Connole got the Utah Hotel contract (R. 451). 
Some technical electrical engineering was required 
whereupon Roy C. Smith of the defendant corporation 
advised Kimball to contact Charles M. Henker of the 
Pacific Elevator and Equipment Company of San Fran-
cisco, California: He was engaged by Kimball for final 
tuning of the control systems on the Medical Arts (Exh. 
"X", R. 293) .. 
Kin1ball Elevator name plates were on the cabs at the 
Medical Arts Building before modernization and also 
afterwards. 
While the job at the Medical Arts Building was 
under consideration and negotiation and the actual let-
ting of the contract and work was accomplished, there 
were many oth.er jobs under consideration which required 
the joint attention and cooperation of the parties. 
On October 2, 1947, plaintiff received proposals from 
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the .J[urphy Elevator pertaining to the Belvedere Apart-
Inents, Salt Lake City, Utah, which included Elevator 
Supplies Company door operator, cab door hangers, 
hatch door hangers, hatch doors, signal equipment, indi-
cator lanterns, upper flow flash light annunciator. The 
bid to the Belvedere Apartments management was made 
by Kimball (Exh. "Z", R. 300). 
The Utah Childrens Hospital or "Polio Hospital" 
at the University of Utah was engineered, esti1nated and 
bid upon in the same fashion. Kimball forwarded specifi-
cations to both l\1urphy Elevator Company and the Ele-
vator Supplies Company. For this job the Kimball Ele-
vator Company included in its bid to the State the use 
of the Elevator Supplies Company signal system, re-
ferred to as "directional collective control," and also car 
position indicators and door operators. At no time did 
the plaintiff company receive <?T ask for quotations from 
any other company on similar equipment (Exh. AA, R. 
302). 
Plaintiff and defendant carried on correspondence 
relative to elevators to be installed or modernized for the 
:Jiountain Fuel Supply Company at Salt Lake City. As 
of s.eptember 15, 1948 plaintiff subnlitted a bid on the 
project in which plaintiff specified and i.ncluded, were it 
a successful bidder, automatic "directional collective con-
trol'' \Vith and without attendant, and variable voltage 
control with automatic two-way leveling to be furnished 
on an installed basis by the defendant company (Exh. 
"BB", R. 305). 
The parties contacted each other concerning an ele-
vator project known as the Continental State Bank of 
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Boise, Idaho, and on September 2 1948 the defendant 
' ' 
company furnished the plaintiff a proposal covering 
synchron control, with "cuts" or illustrations and photo-
graphs of the material and an estimate sheet which set 
forth such work as would be done by the Murphy Eleva-
tor Company (Exh. "CC", R. 306). 
Later the parties worked out an alternate proposal 
on the Boise job and plain tiff bid to install a synchron 
control unit and an L. D. M. operator with safety-edge 
for the doors, door arms, interlocks and hangers,-all to 
be furnish_ed by defendants (Exh. "DD", R. 307). 
The Idaho State Hospital, Blackfoot, Idaho, ca1ne 
up for bid. Plaintiff secured specifications and for-
warded copies to the Murphy Elevator Company and to 
the defendant. Plaintiff thereafter included collective 
selective control as manufactured by the Elevator Sup-
plies Company in its bid (Exh. "EE", R. 509). 
The parties also attempted to secure the contract 
on the Idaho State Hospital at Pocatello. This was a 
complete new elevator with variable voltage selective con-
trol, as was always done, Kimball forwarded the specifi-
cations on this propect to the Elevator Supplies Company 
and the Murphy Elevator Company. Murphy Elevator 
and defendant submitted cost quotations to Kimball set-
ting forth the number of erection hours which would be 
required at the job site (Exh. "F'F", R. 311). Cuts fur-
nished by Murphy Elevator Company reflected the Ele-
vator Supplies equipment to be used. These cuts were 
handed by Kimball to the architects of the project (Exh. 
"GG", R. 312). 
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The cooperation of both. con1panies on the elevator 
construction job at the new Shriner's Hospital, Salt Lake 
City is shown by the exhibit "HH" (R. 313), \vherein 11r. 
Dan vV. Connole on Decernber 18, 194 7 addressed a letter 
on behalf of plaintiff to Elevator Supplies Cornpany, Inc., 
at San Francisco, California, enclosing specifications on 
the job. Defendant in turn communicated with the Mur-
phy Company, with a copy to plaintiff1 p-roposing to 
furnish and install collective selective control, electric 
door operators and signals. Upon receipt of the overall 
inforrnation Kimball bid the job to the general contrac-
tors on the project (R. 313-314). 
Prior to the submission of the foregoing mentioned 
'. ' 
bid, (at the· request of Roy Smith, Di~trict Manager of 
the defendant company), on or about December 21, 1~48, 
the W. S. Tyler Company and the Dahlstrom Company 
quoted Kimball on the doors and cabs (Exh. "II", R. 
314). 
On October 22, 1946, the plaintiff company secured 
a contract for the installation of signal equipment and 
door closers, at the Walker Bank Building, Salt Lake 
City, on !our passenger elevators and issued an order 
thereon to the Elevator Supplies Company (R. 354). 
Thereafter, the Walker Bank Building decided to com-
pletely· modernize the elevators and entered into a can-
cellation agreement (Exh. "F'FF") with Kimball. Plain-
tiff protected the defendant on the job by insisting that 
as a condition to the cancellation the defenda,nt be 
awarded the supply of ·electrical power door operators 
(R. 356). The contract for modernization was later 
R\varded in part to Kimball Elevator and in part to Otis 
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Elevator Company and Elevator Supplies furnished the 
door operators. 
Roy C. Smith also substantiated Connole in cancel-
ling with Walker Bank. Kimball made the arrangen1ent 
and requirement that Otis would use Elevator Supplie~ 
equipment (R~ 909). 
Upon receipt from the architects of specifications for 
elevators in the Ben Albert Apartments to be constructed 
at Salt Lake City, the Kimball Elevator Company for-
warded copies to Elevator Supplies Inc. and to the 1\{ur-
phy Elevator Company, whereupon quotations were re-
turned dated August 30, 1949, including directional col-
lective control and L. D. M. Door operators manufactured 
by the defendant corporation. (Exh. "JJ", R. 316-317) 
(Admitted R. 334). 
The manager of the defendant company for this area, 
Roy Casper Smith, would in many instances accon1pany 
Mr. Connole of Kimball to the job site and together con-
fer 'vith the manage1nent (R. 318). 
Another typical project worked upon by the parties 
was the Latter Day Saints Primary Hospital at Salt Lake 
City. Noven1ber 7, 1949, the defendant quoted to plaintiff 
on installation of directional collective control. Cuts of 
this equipment were furnished plaintiff to be shown the 
architects. 
So that Elevator Supplies and l\{urphy would not 
duplicate the work, they tell Kimball Company: 
"We h;ave included an extra copy of our pro-
posal in case you want to send this to Murphy so 
that they can check to see there is no duplication" 
( Exh. "KK", R. 320) . 
10 
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l(iinball Eleva tor Company thereafter subn1i tted a bid 
specifically including Elevator Supplies equipn1ent in its 
proposal. Kin1ball did not receive or ask for quotations 
on shnilar equipment from any other co1npany (R. 321), 
and as 'vas customary, at the request of Roy C. S.mith 
of the Elevator Supplies, the Tyler Cab Co1npany and 
the Dahlstron1 Company each sub1nitted quotations on 
cabs for the L. D. S. Primary Hospital from district 
offices in San Francisco to the plaintiff co1npany at Salt 
Lake City (Exh. "LL", R. 322). 
The development of the Medical Center at the Uni-
versity of Utah commenced with the Cancer Research 
Building and the plaintiff and defendant companies were 
interested in the elevators (R. 322). Plaintiff secured 
specifications and sent copies thereof to defendant at San 
Franicsco. 11urphy Elevator Co1npany quoted on its por-
tion of the job, and the Dahlstrom and the Tyler Cab 
Companies at the request of Roy C. Smith, district rnana-
ger of the defendant company, submitted a bid to Kimball 
on the cabs (Exh. "MM", December 12,1949, R. 323). The 
plaintiff placed a bid which included and specified the 
directional collective equipment manufactured by the 
defendant corporation. Plaintiff did not seek nor receive 
proposals on similar systems from any oth.er company 
or source. 
The Memorial Building erected by Daughters of 
Utah Pioneers at Salt Lake City was considered by the 
parties and on May 31, 1949, the Elevator Sup·plies Com-
pany submitted its proposals on the electric door oper-
ators and sheave hangers for the hydraulic passenger 
elevator Kimball proposed to erect (Exh. "NN", R. 325). 
11 
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On June 5, 1947, plaintiff also bid on the !)rice Hotel 
at Price, Utah, specifying defendant's directional collec-
tive relay system and Murphy Elevator Company's con-
trols ( Exh. "K", R. 277). The construction of the founda-
tion had been completed and then the work stopped. 
Interest was revived and again the companies, appellant 
and respondent, corresponded efforts to secure the job. 
As shown by Exhibit "00" (R. 326), defendant and 
Murphy Elevator equipment was designed to propose 
and obtain a complete new elevator. 
"Cuts" or illustrative plates of the equipment of 
Murphy Company with defendant's material in place 
were furnished for display and for use in making quota-
tions to customers (Exh. "PP", R .. 328). 
Daniel \V. Connole, of the plaintiff company, and 
Roy Casp-er Smith of the defendant company, together. 
visited the Dooley Building at Salt Lake City prior to 
August 3, 1948 (R. 331). This elev-ator modernization 
included as a portion of the work a complete collective 
selective button type control with electric operators· -and 
automatic leveling on both elevators. Pictures and mimeo-
graphed engineering sh-eets were furnished the plaintiff 
company by the Elevator Supplies for type of car S"~itch 
panels and selectors as manufactured by defendant. 
These photographs 'vere taken to the Dooley Building 
manage1nent by the plaintiff co1npany (Exh. "SS", R. 
335-336). Specifications had been p~epared by a firm of 
architects at Salt Lake City on the entire job (Exh. "QQ" 
and 'RR"). Quotations were 1nade to the plaintiff by the 
defe~dant, and the Murphy Elevator Company also 
quoted on its portion of the work. 
12 
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The files of the Kimball Elevator Company also 
sho'v that the elevator planned in the Annex of the 
R.ogers Hotel at Idaho Falls was worked upon by the 
parties to this action. Specifications were forwarded to 
defendant by plaintiff and, as shown by exhibit "TT", 
car door operators, car door hangers and signal annunci-
ators "\Vere proposed by the defendant and a bid made to 
the 1nanagement by plaintiff (R. 336). 
Prior to October, 1946, plaintiff company had been 
conferring 'vith the management of the Continental Bank 
Building for some time (Exh. "VV", R. 340). Elevator 
Supplies Company proposed to Kimball for complete 
synchron control in modernization of the four elevators 
at that building. ·As time developed, on May 4, 1949, 
another proposal \vas for,varded and the Murphy Eleva-
tor Company gave its estimate on its equipment, together 
"\vith defendant and plaintiff on the job. The Dahlstrom 
1Ietallic Door Company made estimates from its home 
office (Exh. "XX") and furnished cuts of cabs (R. 341). 
In the latter part of 1948 or early '49· Dan W. Con-
nole of the Kimball Elevator Company, Roy C. Smith of 
Elevator Supplies Company and Charles W. Henker of 
the Pacific 'Elevator and equipment Company visited 
the Con tin en tal Bank Building and "talked" eleva tors 
with the O"\Vners, engineers and management of the hank 
building (R. 342). The trio discussed in detail moderniza-
tion of the elevators by use of Elevator Supplies and 
Pacific Elevator equipment (R. 343). As a result of this 
conference, an engineers' estimate was prepared by the 
three companies in order that the hank could call for bids 
(Exh. "YY", R .. 343). The original of this estimate was 
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given to the board of directors. The Kimball Company 
had not and did not contact any other company for pro-
posals on similar equipment (R. 345). 
Together with Pacific Elevator and Equip1nent Coin-
pany, the Kimball Elevator Company working 'vith the 
defendant attempted to secure a job at the Zion's Bene-
fit Building Society, Salt Lake City. The Pacific Eleva-
tor and Equipment Company (assuming the part thereto-
fore occupied by Murphy) indicated what it 'vould fur-
nish Kimball on the job exclusive of the Elevator Sup-
plies Company. 
On the Congress Hotel at Salt Lake City, Mr. 
Connole, manager of the plaintiff, requested Henker of 
the Pacific Comp·any to get together with the Elevator 
Sup~plies Company and make a quotation on the job and 
on _September 6, 1950, Elevator Supplies Co1npany sub-
mitted ·its quotation to Kimball (Exh. '"BBB", R. 347-
348). 
On the University Heights Apartments at S-alt Lake 
City on November 1, 1950, the Elevator Supplies Com-
pany and the Pacific Elevator Company submitted their 
proposal in conformity with the defendant (E:xh. "'CCC", 
R. 349). The W. S. Tyler Company placed its quotation 
to Kimball on the cabs. 
The Charleston Apartments at S-alt Lake City were 
also acted upon by the parties. On April3, 1950 Kimball 
sent the specific-ations to Elevato~ Supplies Company 
and also to the Pacific Elevator Company (R. 350) :and 
on April 10, 1950 Elevator Supplies replied to Kimball 
stating: "We have talked this job over with Pacific and 
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the equipment we have quoted on will tie in with their 
equipment." The defendant also advised the plaintiff 
that they had been in touch with the Tyler and Dahlstrom 
people and that Kimball would receive a quotation on the 
cabs (Exh. '"DDD", R. 351). 
There was also an elevator project at the Deseret 
Ne,vs Building, Salt Lake City, in the spring of 1950. At 
that tin1e the Kin1ball Company requested Elevator Sup-
plies refer the "elevator parts" to Mr. Henker of the 
Pacific Elevator and Equipment Company at San Fran-
cisco, California. Mr. Smith of the Elevator Supplies 
Company talked the job over with Henker (R. 338) and 
the W. S. Tyler Company, and Dahlstrom Cab Com-
panies, at the request of Roy Smith, also made quotations 
to Kimball. As shown by exhibit "UU", the job was bid 
by Kimball with Pacific Elevator furnishing the hoisting 
equipment and controls and Elevator Supplies the door 
operators, the controller, the safety edge, car door con-
tacts and the closers and interlocks. 
Charles Maynard Henker testified that he has been 
in the elevator business since 1924 and is a registered 
electrical engineer of the State of California. He told the 
court and jury that his company engaged in a complete 
line of elevator work (R. 660) and that in October, 1949, 
he 'vas engaged by plaintiff company in an engineering 
capacity on the Medical Arts job and that on the occasion 
he discussed with Connole and Roy C. Smith jobs coming 
up in the area including the Hotel Utah (R. 662). Henker 
described the functions and type of equipment to be fur-
nished by Elevator Supplies and that by Pacific Elevator 
and Equipment Company (R. 670). 
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Henker further testified that he conferred with ~Ir. 
Roy C. Smith on several jobs to be perforn1ed at Salt 
Lake City, such as the Charleston Apart1nent (R·. 680), 
and the Desert News Building (R. 681, Exh. "B"). He 
stated: "it is another typical job of the type wherein all 
three collaborated" ( R. 783). He described the Congress 
Hotel as being "the usual deal between Pacific Elevator 
' Elevator Supplies and Kimball" (R. 683). The l ... ni-
versity Heights apartments (R. 686, Exh. "D") ·were 
quoted upon by Pacific to Kimball. Henk~r further stated 
that his company manufactures relay and control equip-
ment comparable to that of Elevator Supplies (R. 688) 
but that they had never been asked to bid on such equip-
ment in this area by Kimball. Henker further confirn1ed 
the fact that Dan Connole introduced him to representa-
tives of the Continental Bank Building in the co1npany 
of Roy C. Smith of Elevator Supplies and that on the 
occasion of that visit the three co1npanies came up with 
a round figure estimate which was given to the Conti-
nental management (R. 690). He said it was the type of 
job Elevator Supplies would do under an elevator con-
tractor (R. 692). As shown by his testimony and letters 
to Kimball Henker of the Pacific Elevator would confer 
' 
with Smith of Elevator Supplies on equipment Elevator 
S·upplies would furnish before quoting to Kimball (R. 
701, 703). 
Concerning the Hotel Utah-· in November of 1947, 
the plaintiff wrote to both defendant and to the Murphy 
Company telling the1n that the 1nanagement of the hotel 
had requested prices and estimates on the modernization 
of the three passenger elevators (Exh. "GGG", R. 3570). 
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The Elevator Supplies Company on November 18, 1947, 
1uade a quotation to Kimball and ~furphy for synchron 
control, car relay panels, selectors, car push panel but-
tons and annunciator push button boxes and indicators 
'vith all necessary pipe, wire fittings and cable- on an 
installed basis. The plaintiff never asked for and did 
not receive quotations fron1 any other con1pany. The 
hotel did not proceed on this project but put in two new 
service elevators at the rear of the building. 
Since 1947, Roy C. S1nith·, district manager of the 
defendant company, in the company of Mr. Connole of 
plaintiff, conferred at the Hotel Utah with the then 
1nanager, the late Guy Toombs, and also the building 
engineer, Jerry Smith. They discussed the type of equip-
nlent \vhich would be installed (R. 364). Mr. Connole of 
plaintiff and Smith of the defendant company, in 1949 
an<;l 1950 took the Hotel Utah building engineer to the 
:Niedical Arts Building to see the equipment running and 
how it operated (R. 365). 
The parties continued to discuss the Hotel Utah job 
and on J\1ay 11, 1950 the plaintiff wrote to Roy C. Smith 
of the Elevator Supplies requesting that he figure th·e 
job on an installed basis and also asking Smith to confer 
with Charles M. Henker of the Pacific Company for a 
price on three G. E. Controllers and plyathon levers in 
order "that the Medical Arts job could be duplicated." 
On J\Iay 16, 1950, by letter (Exh. "III"), the defend-
ant company wrote Kimball re Hotel Utah and requested 
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. "We have your old elevator layout but out-
Side of the capacity and speed there does not 
appear to be any data which would indicate the 
size of either the drive motor or the generator" 
(R. 361). 
Plaintiff secured the generator readings and sent then1 
on to the defendant company. 
On July 13, 1950, the Pacific Elevator and Equip-
ment Co: proposed to furnish relay panels, selectors, 
cabling, and "general overhaul of the equipment with the 
exception of what the Elevator Supplies people were to 
do", with an estimate of the labor time involved (Exh. 
"J J J", R. 362). Pacific stated: 
"This job should be the first of a lot of big 
modernizations we can do in your area. You 'vill 
have our close cooperation all the way through, 
both in selling and installation." 
On July 14, 1950, the Elevator Supplies Comp~ny 
also made its quotation on the synchron control syste1n 
to plaintiff company for the Hotel Utah. On August 16, 
1950, the plaintiff submitted its bid to the Hotel Utah. 
According to the manager of the plaintiff the bid 'vas 
acco1npanied by cuts to sho'v the Elevator Supplies lines 
(Exh. "KKK", R. 363). 
Mr. Connole, manager of plaintiff, stated that follo,v-
ing the submission of the Kimball bid he had a conversa-
tion with Jerry Smith, the enginer of the Hotel Utah (R. 
371). There was son1e question as to whether or not the 
hotel would desire to change its hall lanterns and push· 
buttons. This equipment is to be furnished by Elevator 
Supplies Company (R. 372). Jerry Smith told Connole 
that Otis Elevator Company was not to be invited to hid 
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on the job. He asked Connole if he had any suggestions 
as to other companies which might desire to bid. Connole 
suggested Westinghouse Electric Co. Later Jerry Smith 
of the Hotel Utah asked if Elevator Supplies would give 
a bid on the total job. Connole stated he did not know. 
That it would be identical equipment and if Smith wanted 
to use it as an estimate he could do so to find if the Kim-
ball bid was in line. Smith said he wanted it for the 
Board. ~ir. Connole stated at that time: 
"I explained to Mr. Jerry Smith it would have 
to be a supporting bid because it was identically 
the same manufacturer and people doing the work. 
He knew that. I told him the bid would be identi-
cally the same people; and I could not see what 
justification there would be for having two people 
bid on identically the same equipment (R. 575-
576). 
(R. 373). Connole telephoned Elevator Supplies a.t San 
Francisco and talked with Roy C. Smith. Connole told 
R. C. S.mith the Hotel Utah would like to have a proposal 
on the overall job to verify the Kimball bid and justifi-
cation of the price quoted. 
Thereafter, Smith and Henker conferred in San 
Francisco. Henker said : 
"Q. We want you to tell us, Mr. Henker, just 
as well as you can remember, what was said be-
tween you. 
"A. Well, I was probably asked by R.oy 
Smith if I would consider presenting a bid from 
Pacif~c Elevator and Equipment Company for this 
part of the work. which would include, well, all 
the work previously tendered to Kimball Elevator 
Company, and our own, and on an installed basis, 
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\vhich was quite a great deal n1ore to Pacific 
Elevator and Equip1nent Company than had pre-
viously been in the l(imball bid. 
"Q. What was said between you when this 
took place~ 
".l\_. When that took place I said, 'well, it \vill 
be perfectly all right with Pacific Elevator and 
Equipment Company, if it is all right with l(im-
ball Elevator Company, to go ahead on that basis.' 
After all, we had a bid already in to l(iinball and 
it was the most natural thing for us to say, 'if it 
is okay with Ki1nball Elevator Company, it will be 
all right'. I think we talked about it with the idea 
that they wanted two bids. In other words, they 
only had one bid and they wan,ted two bid,s, whic·h 
would let them, know abo~~t where they stood, I 
imagin,e, with their first bid. 
"Q. Did they let the Hotel Utah know where 
they stood~ 
"A. Yes. That is a normal procedure of 
buyers of that type. Of course, that is what neces-
sitated the trip for Roy and I, going up there and 
making the survey that we did." 
* * * * * 
"Q. Now, if we understand you correctly, 
you told Mr. Smith, of Elevator Supplies Com-
pany, that you would not make a quotation to 
Elevator Supplies without a clearance from Kim-
ball~ 
"A. That is correct. 
"Q. What did Mr. Smith say to you when 
you told him that~ 
"A. The best I can recall, Roy had the same 
imp,ression that that was a bid, a check bid, and 
naturally it was going to be high.er, being done out 
of San Francisco both by ourselves and them-
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selves. I think the feeling was mutual between us, 
at least it was 1ny impression that the bid would 
be so much higher that there would be nothing to 
it; that the contract would automatically go to 
Kimball Elevator Company." 
Gerald Smith also testified that on August 17 he 
requested Roy C. Smith to make a bid and that Roy Smith 
then stated he \vould have to take the matter under con-
siderat1on and contact his home office for an opinion 
frorn theu1 before he could give a definite answer (R. 
789). Approximately three days later Roy C. Smith con-
ferred by telephone from Seattle and told Gerald Smith 
he thought they vvould be interested. 
Jerry S.mith stated he knew that the Elevator Sup-
plies had already quoted on the job to the Kimball Eleva-
tor Company. 
Roy C. Smith further testified that following his 
company's bid to the Kimball Elevator Company, he 
received a call on August 17, 1950, from Mr. Jerry Smith 
of the Hotel Utah asking for a bid on the entire job (R. 
883) ; that he told Jerry Smith he would have to think it 
over; and that conversation was on Thursday. On the 
following Tuesday he talked from Seattle to Jerry Smith 
and told him he (R. C. Smith) would have to get in touch 
vvith nir. Fanning (home office) and would let him know 
as soon as possible (R. 884). 
Henker further stated that when they arrived at Salt 
Lake City he discussed the matter with Connole and 
Smith and that they indicated they were in agreement 
(R. 677). 
Connole postively states that he requested Roy C. 
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Smith to n1ake a supporting bid (R,. 546) ~ that he spent 
several evenings wih 1\!r. Henker \vhile he \vas in Salt 
Lake City to estimate the job and that Mr Henker never 
expected to make a firm bid. 
When Smith of defendant Co1npany had his proposal 
ready to turn in to the hotel he came to the office of the 
plaintiff at Salt Lake City, on the Dinwoody Furniture 
job or the Utah Agricultural job, and stated the Elevator 
S.upplies proposal wuold be $18,000.00 higher (R. 376). 
Thereafter Smith ca1ne to the Kimball office and in-
formed them he had been awarded the Hotel Utah con-
tract. 
On September 11, 1950, the same day that the defend-
ant company submitted its quotation to the Hotel Utah, it 
sub1nitted a revised quotation on the same job to plain-
tiff. Although the quotation eliminated the night attend-
ant feature the price was raised $2,000.00 to the sum of 
$34,637 (Exh. "LLL", R. 378). 
When the revised quotation was made to Kimball, 
the same letter stated tha.t defendant was making a direct 
quotation to the hotel on "D. W." (dumb waiter) equip-
Inent. No reference was made to a direct quotation on the 
sychron control equipment (R. 379). 
Smith also admitted he knew no other elevator or 
supply company was making prop-osals to Kimball be-
yond his own company and the Pacific Elevator because 
. the two systems would have to synchronize (R. 926). And 
that he did not receive any request for an estimate from 
Connole but his quotation was upon the request of the 
Hotel (R. 927). Smith also denied any conversation con-
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cerning a supporting bid with Henker but said he was 
going to tell Kimball what it was all about when he got 
to Salt Lake (R. 930). 
Connole considered the items of repair suggested 
by the Pacific Elevator Company in its ·proposal and 
indicated the cost of following through would be slight 
( R. 384, 385, 386) . 
:Nir. Connole compared Exhibit "I", the Kimball bid 
of $59,600.00 and Exhibit "J", the Elevator Supplies 
contract and stated that his quotation included all of the 
vvork except the replacement of the sheaves. That Eleva-
tor Supplies had made an allowance of $3,500 per cab 
and that the Kimball allowance was $1,800.00, ·but as 
there was no specification on the cabs th.e exact price 
could not be determined until the hotel made a selection 
(R. 389). 
After Roy C. Smith advised Kimball that the con-
tract had been taken, Connole went to see Max Carp·enter, 
Hotel Utah manager, and asked him if it would be possi-
ble the contract issue to Kimball. Carpenter said he had 
nothing against Kimball Elevator Company and he would 
check on it. The next day Carpenter told Connole the 
hotel could not do so because Elevator Supplies reported 
if this were done the price would have to be increased 
(R. 392). 
It was shown that cordial relations at all times existed 
between these two companies and at no time prior to 
September 27, 1950 did Kimball consider Elevator Sup-
plies as a competitor (R. 412). At no time prior to Sep-
tember 27, 1950 in operations in Utah, Nevada, Wyoming, 
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Montana, Washington and Idaho, had the Elevator Sup-
plies Company acted as an original contractor. 
As shown by the record (Exh. "QQQ", R. 413), on 
January 13, 1950, in a letter concerning the \T eterans 
Hospital at Salt Lake City, R.oy Smith advised that Ele-
vator Supplies were not able to secure plans and specifi-
cations because they were not a prime bidder (R. 414). 
The record further discloses that elevator parts pur-
chased from the defendant by catalogue number (Exh. 
"L", R. 416) were not purchased or quoted upon in the 
same manner as a modernization system (R. 416). 
The Kin1ball Elevator Company acts as an original 
contractor (R. 420). 
Mrs. Rod Con ole, secretary Kimball. Elevator Conl-
pa.ny, verified that Daniel W. Connole made a call to 
Roy Smith at San Ftancisco on August 18, 1950; that 
Connole then told Smith of the desire for a bid to verify 
Kimball's quoted price; and also made request for Ele-
vator Supplies to submit a supporting bid. Mrs. Connole 
further stated that at the time of Smith's visit to Salt 
Lake he stated he would make his quotation about 
$18,000 to $19,000 higher than the Kimball Elevator bid. 
Also at no time was Roy Smith or Elevator Supplies 
considered a competitor of the plaintiff. 
At no time was plaintiff's bid increased 26% (R. 
421). Connole told Jerry S1nith, Engineer of the Hotel 
Utah there would possibly be a slight increase in electri-
cal equipment and at that time Smith said he was not 
sure they would re-use the outside lanterns. 
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The average life of an elevator is t'venty to twenty-
five years, and the elevators at the Hotel Utah would not 
require another complete renovation for at least that 
time (R.424). 
The president and manager of the plaintiff company 
testified that in his opinion the advertising value to 
plaintiff company of the nameplates at the thresholds of 
the cabs in the passenger elevators at the Hotel Utah 
'vould be $30,000 over a period of 20 years ( R. 443). 
Emerson S. S.rnith, a witness for the plaintiff, testi-
fied that for the past 26 years he has engaged in the 
advertising and public relations field and for 13 years 
past at Salt Lake City; that he is familiar with the num-
ber of rooms in the Hotel Utah, the number of service 
clubs and the type of patrons and invitees using the hotel 
(R. 555). He stated-a company's name on the threshold 
of the three passenger elevators at the Hotel Utah would 
have a value of $1,000 per year (R. 556). 
He also stated that the prestige of having the equip-
ment in the Hotel Utah would be of tremendous value 
for future sales. 
Smith pointed up something which has always been 
true, and especially true of the elevator industry: "* * * 
it has been accepted practice that the manufacturer of a 
product, shall be entitled to identify it, as a protective 
measure not only for the public but also for himself (R. 
563, 564, 565). 
The annuity schedule presented to the jury (Exh. 
"UUU", R. 625), gave a guide to show the present in hand 
.value q_f money which would be received at $1,000 per 
25 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
year over a ten, fifteen, twenty and twenty-five year 
basis ( R. 626). 
The preponderence of the evidence in every respect 
_justifies the conclusion reached by the jury and its 
verdict. The manager and engineer at the Hotel Utah 
Company found themselves in the position of anxiously 
supporting the contract signed on the hotel's behalf with 
the defendant company, in view of the statements of the 
witnesses for tlie plaintiff that the contract as signed 
was intended as only a supporting bid. The jury had the 
right to disregard their testimony in its entirety or to 
believe or discredit such testimony in each of the jurors 
own judgment. The circumstances surrounding state-
ments made by both of these witnesses- n1ade the reli-
ability of such statements so doubtful and incomparable 
that the jury could put little weight on such testimony. 
Both witnesses were openly anagonistic to the plaintiff's 
cause and yet the record shows that prior to the filing of 
the lawsuit, the plaintiff company enjoyed a very good 
busines relationship with the Hotel Utah and with its 
personnel. 
Positi.ve Nu.mber One: 
THERE WAS AN AGREEMENT NOT TO CO~i­
PETE. 
The overwhelming weight of the evidence supports 
the verdict of the jury and the position of the plaintiff 
that through a long course of business dealings the de-
fendant established itself as a supplier and the plaintiff 
as an original contractor. It was uniform practice for 
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the plaintiff to submit specifications on a job to 
the defendant and request quotations on elevator !nate-
rials f.o.b., or on control systen1s installed at the job site. 
Frequently representatives of the parties would consult 
and collaborate on specifications and designs 1uost suit-
able for the custo1ner. On many occasions representa-
tives of both parties would jointly confer 'vith a custorner 
or building owners and thereafter - based upon quota-
tions made by the defendant to the plaintiff - plaintiff 
would bid the overall and complete job. If the job were 
secured the plaintiff, Kimball Elevator Co1npany of 
Utah, would act as the original contractor and the defend-
ant, Elevator Supplies Company, would act as supplier 
or sub-contractor under the plaintiff. 
It was conclusively established that elevator lnod-
ernizations projects involved considerable expen-se to 
building management and that such projects entailed long 
term planning of i1nportance to the owner, the elevator 
companies and to the elevator supplier. 
In 12 Am. Jur. 498, the law is siinply and clearly 
stated: 
"Contracts are express or in1plied. I1nplied 
contracts are implied in fact or in law. Contracts 
are express when their terms are not so stated. 
Contracts implied in fact are inferred from the 
facts and circumstances of the case and are not 
formally or explicitly stated in words, etc. It is 
often stated that the only difference between an 
express contract and a contract implied in fact 
is that in former the parties arrive at their agree-
ment by word, whether oral or written, sealed or 
unsealed while in the latter, their agreement is 
arrived at by a consideration of their acts and 
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conduct, and that in both of these cases there is, 
in fact, a contract existing between the parties, 
the only difference being in the character of evi-
dence necessary to establish it. (See numerous 
citations)." 
Considering the great abundance of proof, both oral 
and docun1entary, offered by the plaintiff in proof of and 
sho,ving the existence of such an agreement the honorable 
court properly instructed the jury and presented for its 
detern1ina tion the issue as to the existence of an agree-
n1ent. The jury found in favor of the plaintiff. Plain-
tiff subn1its that reasonable minds could not differ as to 
its existence. 
Defendant seeks to attack the legality of this agree-
nlen through arguments which are based on the assump-
tion that the defendant, Elevator Supplies Company, was 
a competitor of plaintiff and that the agreement would 
be in restraint of trade and its effect would be to stifle 
competion. 
The parties to this action were never competitors nor 
did they ever deal at arms length. The plaintiff was 
selling the defendant's supplies and control systems and 
it \vas inct1mhent upon plaintiff to deal with the defend-
ant after the plaintiff had urged the customer to use 
defendant's systen1 and after plaintiff made its bid based 
upon quotations received from the defendant. 
It is neither the intent nor purpose of the Sherman 
Act or the Clayton Act to nullify or abolish agreements 
necessarily n1ade in the ordinary and regular channels 
of trade. The plaintiff, without such an understanding, 
would find itself in the anamalous and al,vays risky posi-
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tion of seeking quotations from the defendant, then 
attempting to compete on a price to the custoiner. An1eri-
can free enterprise would suffer, if such vvere the la-\v. 
Positive Number Two: 
THE AGREEMENT WAS NOT IN RESTRAINT 
OF TRADE. 
There is not one item of evidence in the entire record 
. 
which would indicate that the agreement was in rPstraint 
of trade or would have the effect of stifling co1npetition 
or creating a 1nonopoly. The defendant through its long 
course of dealings merely promised it would not quote 
direct to to building 1nanagement where plaintiff had re-
quested a quotation from the. defendant and plaintiff 
had thereafter submitted a bid to the building Inanage-
ment. In not one instance is there shown any con1bina-
tion or agreement of competitors but rather a 1nere as-
surance on the part of a manufacturer or wholesaler that 
it vvould not sell directly to the consumer. 
The following appears in 58 C.J.S. 1023: 
"In the absence of any intent or purpose to 
create or maintain a monopoly, a trader or Inanu-
facturer engaged in an entirely private business 
has a right to exercise his own independent dis-
cretion as to persons with whom he may deal, un-
less a refusal to deal with a person is part of an 
illegal conspiracy or combination. He 1nay sell 
or refuse to sell to whom he pleases, and may buy 
or refuse to buy from whom he pleases. This rule 
is not affected by state anti trust statutes or by 
the federal anti trust acts unless the actual effect 
of such conduct is substantially to lessen coinpeti-
tion or to restrain trade." 
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Citing: 
"The anti trust laws do not restrict the right 
of a 1nanufacturer freely to exercise his own in-
dependent discretion as to the parties with whom 
he will deal. U. S. v. Parker Rust Proof Co., 61 
F·ed~ Supp. 805." 
U. S. v. Aluminum Company of America, 447 
Supp. 97, cause certified and transferred 64 S. 
Ct. 1281, 322 U.S. 716, 88 L. Ed. 1557, reversed 
on other grounds. C.C.A. 1487 2d 416. 
The agree1nen t here, in fact, supports rather than 
restrains competition. Such an agreement could not pos-
sibly establish a monopoly in derogation of the public 
interest since the parties were subject to competition 
from other elevator COinpanies. Even the aefendant 
argued in court that it had on occasion submitted quota-
tions to elevator companies other than plaintiff. 
The following note appears in Title 15 of U.S.C.A.: 
"The Sherman Act was intended to secure 
equality of opportunity and to protect the public 
against evils commonly incident to monopolies and 
those abnormal contracts and combinations which 
tend directly to suppress the conflict for advan-
tage called 'competition' - the play of th~ con-
tending forces ordinarily engendered by an honest 
desire for gain. 'The statute did not forbid or 
restrain the power to make normal and usual 
contracts to further trade by resorting to all nor-
mal Inethods, whether by agreement or otherwise, 
to accomplish such purpose. The words "re-
straint of trade" should be given a 1neaning which 
would not destroy th·e individual right to con-
tract, and render difficult if not impossible any 
movement of trade in the channels of interstate 
co1nmerce-the free movement of which it was the 
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purpose of the statute to protect.' United States 
v. American Tobacco Co., N.Y. 1911, 31 S. Ct. 
632, 221 U.S. 106, 179, 180, 55 L. Ed. 663, 693, 694. 
See also, F'ederal Trade Connnission v. Sinclair 
Ref. Co., 1923, 43 S. Ct. 450, 261 U.S. 463, 67 L. Ed. 
7 46; Charles A. Ramsay Co. v. Associated Bill 
Posters, N.Y. 1923, 43 S. Ct. 167, 260 U.S. 501, 
67 L. Ed. 368." 
It was apparent that the relay control syste1ns as 
developed by the Elevator Supplies Company \Vere to be 
sold in a co1npetitive field and that no 1nonopoly or detri-
ment to the public interest could possibly result through 
the business practice followed by the parties to this cause. 
It is further set forth in the Code: 
"It has now become a settled rule that only 
unreasonable restraint of trade or con11nerce are 
within the prohibition of this section. Standard 
Oil Co. v. U.S., No. 1911, 31 S. Ct. 502, 221 U.S. 
1, 55 L. Ed. 619, Ann. Cas. 1912D·, 734, 34 L.R.A. 
N.S., 834. See also, U.S. v. American Tobacco 
Co., N.Y. 1911, 31 S. Ct. 632, 650, 221 U.S. 106, 
55 L. Ed. 633; U. S. v. Trans-Missouri F'reight 
Ass'n., Kan. 1897, 17 S. Ct. 540, 166 U.S. 290, 
41 L. Ed. 1007; U.S. v. Fur Dressers' & Fur Dyers' 
Ass'n., D.C.N.Y. 1925, 5 F. 2d 869; F·osburgh v. 
California, etc., Sugar Refining Co., C.C.A. Cal. 
1923, 291 F·. 29; Lee Line Steamers v. Memphis 
Helena & Rosedale Packet Co., C.C.A. Tenn. 1922, 
277 F. 5; McLatchy v. King, C.C. Mass. 1917, 250 
F. 920; American Press Ass'n. v. U.S .. , Ill. 1917, 
245 F. 91, 157 C.C.A. 387, L.R.A. 1918A, 1039; 
Paterson v. U.S., Ohio 1915, 222 F·. 599, 138 C.C.A. 
123, certiorari denied 35 s .. Ct. 939·, 238 U.S. 635, 
59 L. Ed. 1499 ;" (The note continues with nu-
merous federal and state citations.) 
"Restrictions imposed by sections 1-7 of this 
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title are not mechanical or artificial but set up 
essential standard of reasonableness and called 
for vigilance in detection and frustration of all 
eff<?rts unduly to restrain free course of inter-
state commerce and do not seek to establish a mere 
delusive liberty either by 1naking impossible the 
nor1nal and rair expansion of that commerce or 
the adoption of reasonable measure to protect it 
. fron1 injurious and destructive practices and to 
pron1ote con1petition on a sound basis. U. S. v. 
Inter-Island Steam Nav. Co., D.C. Hawaii 1950, 
87 F. Supp. 1010." 
There i~ no reason at law or equity, nor no rule in 
legislation or custom against selection of customers. The 
agreement to refrain fro1n a d~rect quotation is not inter-
dicted by congressional act or state law. 
In ]?ederal Trade Commission v. Raymond Bros. 
Clark Co,., 263 U.S. 564, 44 S. Ct. 162, 68 L. Ed. 448, 30 
A.L.R. 111 ±, J\Ir. Justice Sanford, speaking for the Court 
stated: 
"It is the right, 'long recognized' of a trader 
engaged in an entirely private business, 'freely to 
exercise his own independent discretion as to the 
parties 'vith "'ho1n he \vill deal.' (citations) Thus, 
a retail dealer has the unquestioned right to stop 
dealing \Yith a 'vholesaler for reasons satisfactory 
to hi1nself. (Citations.) He 1nay lawfully make a 
fixed rule of conduct not to buy from a producer 
or 1nanufacturer \vho sells to constm1ers in compe-
tition 'vith himself. (Citations.) Or he may stop 
dealing ''"·ith a wholesaler who he thinks is acting 
unfairly in trying to under1nine his trade. ( Cita-
tions.) Likewise, a 'v hole sale dealer has the right 
to stop dealing with a n1anufacturer for reasons 
sufficient to himself. And he may do so because 
he thinks such Inanufacturer is undermining his 
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trade by selling either to a co1npeting \vholesaler 
or to a retailer competing with his own custo1ners. 
Such other wholesaler or retailer has the re-
ciprocal right to stop dealing vvith the Inanu-
facturer. * 'M: *'' 
"A different case would of course be pre-
sented if the ~ayn1ond Company had co1nbined 
and agreed vvith other wholesale dealers that none 
\vould trade with any 1nanufacturer \vho sold to 
other wholesale dealers co1npeting \vitli theln-
selves, or to retail dealers co1npeting \Vith their 
custo1ners. An act when lavvful vvhen done hy one 
may become vvrongful vvhen done by many acting 
in concert, taking on the for1n of a conspiracy 
which 1nay be prohibited if the result be hurtful 
to the public or the individual against \Yhom the 
concerted action is directed." 
See also: 
Menrnin Company v. Federal Trade Co1nmission, 
288 Fed. 7 44, 30 A.L.R. 1127, Cert. denied, 67 
L. Ed. 1219. 
The san1e rule is set forth in 36 Am. J~tr., at 
page 504: 
''One who is not bound by contract or public 
duty has the right under ordinary conditions to 
refuse to sell his property to, or to have other 
dealings with, any other person, absolutely or 
conditionally, regardless of reason or 1notive; and 
any loss or injury thereby inflicted upon the 
other person is damnem absqu injuria, and gives 
rise to no legal liability." 
Citing: 
Moore v. New York Cotton Excha,nge, 270 U.S. 
593, 70 L. Ed. 750, 46 S. Ct. 367, 45 A.L.R. 1370; 
Federal Trade Commission v. Raymond Bros. 
Clark Co., 263 U.S. 565, 68 L. Ed. 448, 44 S. Ct. 
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162, 30 A.L.R. 1114 ; (and 1nany other decisions). 
The defendant by stipulation in open court, adn1itted 
that in Utah, Idaho and Montana, prior to September 
11, 1950 all quotations on synchron control, collective and 
duplex collective control were made exclusively to origi-
nal elevator contractors (R .. 858-859). There was abso-
lutely no evidence which could possibly lead to the con-
clusion that it would have been illegal for the defendant 
to continue its long, custo1nary and well establised method 
of doing business. 
In Associated Perfumers v. Andelmo;n, et al., 316 
Mass. 176, 55 N.E. 2d 209, it is stated: 
"Where considering a contract in the light of 
business and situation of parties and circum-
stances with reference to which it was made, it 
appears that restraint contracted for is an honest 
purpose, is only such as affords a fair protection 
to the legitimate interests of party in whose favor 
it is imposed, and not so large as to interfere with 
interests of the public, the restraint is reasonable 
and the contract valid." 
The rule is outlined in 17 C.J.S. at page 639: 
''Subject to the rules of public policy against 
contracts detrimental to the public interest and 
lessening con1peti tion, and certain inhil;>itions 
against con1binations in restraint of trade, agree-
ments generally providing that one person will 
trade or do business only with another person or 
in a certain way for a definite or an indefinite 
period are ordinarily valid if reasonable and 
necessary to the protection of the interests of the 
covenantee. The same is true of agreements re-
straining a person from carrying on business in 
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certain pre1nises, or agreements reasonably re-
stricting the use to be made of pren1ises. l\Iany 
other agree1nents of si1nilar character have been 
sustained by the courts as legal and binding obli-
gations, where not unreasonably in restraint of 
trade. Seymour l\{fg. Co. v. Derby ~Jfg. Co., 109 ... ~ 
395, 94 Conn. 311." 
In the Derby Mfg. Co. case the Court stated: 
"Of course the defenda.nt cannot bid against 
the plai.ntiff for any contract and a.t the sanl,e 
time agree to a.ct as plaintiff's bailee for h~ire in 
assisting to fill it. But this does not make the 
bailment or the agree1nent as to tern1s on "\vhich 
such bailment will thereafter be undertaken, il-
legal at common law or under the Shern1an Act. 
"It is also claimed that the contract is illegal 
because the defendant a,grees not to make a.ny bid 
or take any order for bands. We find no prohibi-
tion in the contract against the defendant accept-
ing business on its o'vn account. (It is only 'vhere 
the agree1nent is concerned between then1 as to 
price and this has nothing to do with restraining 
business between the parties.)" 
United States v. Colga.te & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 39 S. 
Ct. 465, 63 L. Ed. 992, holds : 
"In the absence of any purpose to create or 
maintain a monopoly the Sher1nan Anti Trust Act 
of July 2, 1890 does not restrict the long recog-
nized right of a trader or manufacturer, engaged 
in an entirely private business, freely to exercise 
·his own independent discretion as to the parties 
with who1n he will deal and to announce in advance 
the circumstances under which he refuses to sell." 
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Positive Number Three: 
THE AGREEMENT IS SUPPORrrED BY LEG·AL 
CONSIDERATION. 
Defendant argues that positively nothing passed 
fron1 the plaintiff to the defendant in support of the 
agTeement which could possibly constitute a legal consid-
eration. 
Defendant does not recognize the tilne, effort and 
expens~ occasioned on plaintiff's part in securing good 
will, local con ta.cts, copies of specifications, and estima-
tions including the defendant's materials and relay sys-
tems on a job. It was shown by a positive preponderance 
of the evidence that the plaintiff constantly and without 
exception atten1pted to convince its prospects of the 
superior quality of the defendant's signal and relay 
control systen1; that plaintiff did not seek quotations on 
such systen1s from the defendant's competitors; that the 
defendant kne\v plaintiff was dealing exclusively with the 
defendant in this regard; and that defendant knew plain-
tiff \Vas esti1natin_g and including defendant's equipment 
specifically in its quotations to the customer or building 
O\vners. Also there was certainly a promise from the 
defendant to the plaintiff that \vhen plaintiff requested 
and secured a quotation on Elevator Supplies 1naterial 
and thereafter based thereon made plaintiff's bid to the 
customer including defendant's material, that defendant 
\Vould not bid directly to that customer. There was also 
a pron1ise running fron1 the plaintiff to use defendant's 
1naterial since it was unequivocally established such was 
all plain tiff ever specified and estimated. 
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All of the parts of a transaction will be considered 
to ascertain vvhether a consideration sustains a contract. 
Bennett v. Bau.m, 133 N.W. 439, 90 Neb. 320. 
Mutual pro1nises express or i1nplied furnish consid-
eration for an executory contract. McDonald v. ---~fc­
Donald, Tex. Civ. App. 143 S.W. 2d 142. 
A consideration for a proinise is an act other than 
a promise, a forbearance, the creation, 1nodification 
or destruction of a legal relation, or a return pro1nise. 
Latin~er v. Holla.day, 134 P. 2d 183, 103 Utah 152. 
A pro1nise for a promise is good consideration and 
will always support a contract. Chicago Title and T,rust 
Co. v. Two-0-0ne Building ·corporation., 32 N.E. 2d 352, 
308 Ill. A pp. 673. 
Where contract by \Vhich defendant co1npany \Yas 
made an exclusive distributor of defendants radios, 
refrigerators, and vvas.hing Inachines within a certain 
territory lacked mutuality at its inception, evidence of 
performance by defendant established that a "considera-
tion" arose which related back to unilateral promise and 
caused contract to become obligatory. Hedeman v. 
Fairbanks Morse & Co., 36 N.E. 2d 129, 286 N.Y. 240. 
Although the manager of the Pacific Elevator and 
Equipment Company of San Francisco, had been asoci-
ated with the plaintiff company for a period of approxi-
mately two years only, he testified that it was valuable 
for his company to have a representative in the inter-
mountain area. The defendant company, after having 
associated with the plaintiff for more than twenty-five 
years, would now assert that the representation of the 
plaintiff and the close business association of the parties 
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\Vas ab~olutely of no Yalue. The con1parison of comments 
1nade by con1panies in so1newhat the san1e field accentu-
ate the attitude of the defendant. It is obvious: 
Firstly, the defendant con1pany knew that plaintiff 
\vas quoting the customers on equipment \vhich it had 
Inanufactured, trade-n~n1ed and offered to plaintiffunder 
'''ritten specifications on particular jobs. 
Secondly, the defendant knew that the plaintiff was 
bidding this n1aterial in the overall job to the plaintiff's 
custon1ers. 
Thirdly, the Elevator S·upplies Company knew that 
the plaintiff was not securing quotation.s on similar equip-
ment fron1 con1petitors of Elevator Supplies (R. 296). 
Fourthly, it was of direct value to the defendant 
to have its equip1nent quoted for sale. 
Fifthly, there 'vas an irrevocable commitment made 
by the Kimball Elevator Company to the Elevator Sup-
plies Co1npany to purchase the· material, if the plain-
, 
tiff \Vere awarded a job. The plaintiff could not but in-
stall the defendant's system, since the system had been 
diseussed and featured in direct talks and dealings with 
the custo1ner. 
Disregarding the acts of the plaintiff in supporting 
defendant's products,· even slight consideration is suffi-
cient to sustain a con tract and courts will not look closely 
into the adequacy of consideration. Brawley v. Research 
Foundation) 166 P. 2d 392, 73 Cal. App. 2d 103. 
Defendant knew and understood it would benefit 
through the plaintiff and in this regard there was a 
mutuality of contract existing between them. Y o'l1/n.g v. 
Mas on Walsh Co., 33 F. Supp. 358; City of Atlanta v. 
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Del( alb, 26 S.E. 2d 334, 196 Ga. 252; Western Bea·uty 
S·upply Co. v. Duart Sales Co., 133 P. 2d 202, 192 Old. 
6. In this situation giving rise to this case plaintiff had 
fulfilled its part by making a bid to the hotel undeniably 
including defendant's relay control system. 
The agreement was not waived by the plaintiff and 
the evidence by a great preponderance supports the 
finding of the jury and its verdict. 
Positive N~tmber Fottr: 
THE AGREEMENT WAS NOT WAIVED. 
The representative of the defendant co1npany, both 
in his deposition and on the witness stand before the jury, 
denied that he had received a call from the plaintiff coln-
pany requesting a supporting bid or estimate for the 
hotel on the overall job and that he had ever discussed 
this with Mr. Henker of the Pacific Company before coin-
ing with him to Salt Lake City. 
Henker states positively that the representative of 
the defendant company talked with him about the situa-
tion sometime prior to the trip of August 29th to Salt 
Lake City. He stated the conversation vvas between hinl-
self and Roy Smith by telephone, in person, or by both 
methods. Although Henker could not remen1ber the exact 
words of the conversation, he definitely was of the san1e 
impression as Roy Smith that there were no other bidders 
than Kimball on the job, that the __ hotel wanted a check 
bid or an estimate and that due to the situation of Ele-
vator Supplies and Pacific, any estimate given by then1 
to the hotel would be so much higher that necessarily 
the job would automatically go to Kimball. He further 
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pointed out that he had refused to give any figures to the 
defendant company until he had definitely determined 
that Dan Connole and Roy Smith were in agree1nent. 
After working to secure a job since prior to 1946 
it is not reasonable to assume that Kimball could have 
been in agree1nent for Elevator Supplies to make a firm 
bid and take the contract. Neither could the defendant' 
so conclude or reasonably ask the jury to so conclude. 
Mrs. R.od Connole, Mr. Henker and Dan Connole testified 
to the contrary and Roy Smith's statements in the Kim-
ball office shows that he was definitely in agreement 
\vith them. 
Counsel for appellant argues that this would be con-
trary to public policy and void and cites McMullin v. 
Hoffn~an) 174 U.S. 1117, 43 Lawyers Ed. 683, and cases 
of sin1ilar import, as authority for this position. The 
JJJ cJJ ullin case concerned a secret agreement between 
bidders on a public contract for the improvement of the 
water supply of the city of Portland. It was a collusive 
agreement. The Supreme Court concludes its statement 
of the facts with this statement. "This community of 
interest was to be kept secret and concealed from all 
persons including the water committee." The case is 
not in point at all since Mr. Connole not only introduced 
the n1a.nager of Hotel U t.ah to defendant's representative, 
and took representatives ·of Hotel Utah to the Medical 
Arts Building pent house to see the defendant's relay 
control systen1 in operation and also on one occasion this 
was done in Roy Smith's company. There is no question 
but what the Hotel Utah people knew the plaintiff was 
using Elevator Supplies' system and certainly Connole 
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told the representatives of the hotel that any quotation 
by Elevator Supplies could be only an estimate. The facts 
were on the table a.s far as plaintiff and the hotel \vere 
concerned and the McMullin v. Hoffman case or any 
other case based upon collusion, is not good authority 
here. 
In addition to the close association of the parties, 
their frequent visits together to the Hotel Utah and the 
conferences concerning the equipment sold by the defend-
ants, the building engineer Jerry Smith \Vas directly 
informed by Connole of the plaintiff company th-at any 
bid made by the defendant could only be an estin1ate as 
it was the same equipment set forth in the Kimball bid. 
One definition of collusion set forth by Black's Lazv 
Dictionary, page 352, reads : 
"A secret arrange1nent between two or n1ore 
persons, whose interests are apparently conflict-
ing, to make use of the for1ns and proceedings of 
law in order to defraud a third person, or to ob-
tain that which justice would not give them, by 
deceiving a court or its officers. Baldvvin v. New 
York, 45 Barb. (N.Y.) 359; Belt v. Blackburn, 
28 1\fd. 235; Railroad Co. v. Gay, 86 Tex. 571, 26 
S.W. 599, 25 L.R .. A. 52; Balch v. Beach, 119 Wis. 
77, 95 N.W. 132. 
"In divorce proceedings, collusion is an agree-
ment between husband and wife that one of them 
shall co1n1ni t, or appear to have committed, or be 
represented in court as having committed, acts 
constituting a cause of divorce, for the purpose of 
enabling the other to obtain a divorce. Civil Code 
Cal. 114. But also means connivance or conspiracy 
in initiating or prospecting the suit, as where 
there is a compact for mutual aid in carrying it 
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through to a decree. Beard v. Beard, 65 Cal. 354, 
4 P. 229; Pohlman v. Pohln1an, 60 N.J. Eq. 28, 
46 Atl. 658; Drayton v. Drayton, 54 N.J. Eq. 298, 
38 A. 25; Harne v. Harne, 141 Md. 123, 118 A. 
122, 123; Stewart v. Stewart, 93 N.J. Eq. 1, 114 
A. 851, 852; McCauley v. McCauley, 88 N.J. Eq. 
392, 103 A. 20, 23; Underwood v. Underwood, 50 
App. D.C~ 323, 271 F. 553, 555." 
The forthright statements. to the Hotel Utah by Con-
nole of the plaintiff corporation do wholly away with 
contentions by defendant that the plaintiff attempted 
to collude against the hotel. Consider the conversation 
bet,veen Jerry Smith of the hotel and the representative 
of the plaintiff. Also examine the fringe of the testimony 
given by the witnesses Smith, Jerry· and Roy, regarding 
the request of the hotel for a direct quotation. The jury 
considered the entire circu1nstances and found for the 
plaintiff. 
Jerry Smith produced a telephone check to prove he 
had called San Francisco on this subject. Roy Smith 
stated he had been called but that he did not make a 
decision because he had to contact the home office. He 
gave the same state1nent from Seattle sometime later. 
Not only did. Smith of the Hotel Utah know it was an 
extraordinary ·request and understand the reason the 
defendant hesitated to bid but he n1ust have also realized 
the ·situation ·in which Elevator Supplies found itself. 
No fraud or collusion .was atte1npted by the plaintiff. 
No over-estiinated contract was submitted to the Hotel 
by the plain tiff. 
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Posi.tive N 11;mber Five: 
rr,HE A WARD OF DA~fAGES WAS JUSrr, 
The appellant assigns a substantial portion of the 
argument in its brief to a claim that the award by the 
jury is excessive. Counsel attempted before the jury to 
con1pare the experience of the defendant on the job and 
the figures used by the plaintiff in its quotation to the 
hotel. The defendant asserted-we did not 1nake a profit 
so you 1nust not give the plaintiff a verdict, the plaintiff 
would have lost on this job. We in fact rescued then1 
fro1n their own folly. 
The plaintiff invited the court and jury to scrutinize 
its books and records. The summarization of its calcu-
lations on the hotel job was introduced as exhibit "SSS". 
That exhibit actually shows a n1argin of $12,899.08. The 
jury. cut this ite1n of da1nage to $8,555.00. 
This Court has repeatedly held that a verdict 1nust 
be plainly wrong and manifestly against the 'veight of 
the evidence in order for it to be set aside. People v. 
Swasey, 6 U. 9,3, 21 P. 400; United' States v. Brown, 6 
W n. 115, 21 P. 461. 
The plaintiff submitted only one proposal to the 
Hotel Utah before the job was taken by the defendant in 
its own name. Yet the brief of counsel for appellant goes 
on and on claiming the award of damages is excessive 
since there were items in its $79,500 contract which the 
plaintiff had not figured. Mr. Connole explained the 
significance of the items of repair recommended by 
Henker of the Pacific Company both from the functional 
standpoint and monitary cost. Most of the items, with 
the exception of the drive sheaves and hoisting cables 
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had been originally included. Surprisingly, even if coun-
sel's argun1ents _were competent, the a'vard would still 
hold as being fair, just, and reasonable. Counsel would 
attack the business acumen of the Kimball people; how-
ever, Roy C. Smith repeatedly "indicated that the Kimball 
people knew their bu:siness. 
Counsel for appellant stay on the_ old i·ule of law that 
profits 'vhich are pur~ly imaginary and speculative may 
not be assigned as an item of damage or recovered be-
cause they are not pro~able. 
Plaintiff brought before the jury its business experi-
ence on the l\1edical Arts _job and also showed the court 
and jury its books and records. Exhibit "SS-S" was a 
complete su1n1narization and certainly justified and sup-
ports the finding of a loss of profits, which could well 
exceed the figure awarded by the jury. 
This honorable court will remember that the· de-
fendant had quoted to the plaintiff. upon a substantial 
portion of the job on an installed basis and that its price 
to the plaintiff company included a discount of 10%. 
The plaintiff had a margin of 10% in the quotation made 
by the defendant .. The Pacific Elevator and Equipment 
Co. -had quot~d equipn1ent at a certain price_ and had 
also given an esti1nate of the _'~crew days" required to 
con1plete the: job. The Dahlstrom Cab Co. al~o offered 
pl~intiff a discount of 10% and the allowance of $1800.00 
fo:r cabs 'vould bring the plaintiff at a price of $180 on 
each· cab; ho,vever, as indicated by the manager of the 
plaintiff con1pany_ th~ cost of cabs would undoubtedly go 
well over $3,QOO and would there~ or-~ : return _a p;rof-~t 
t<;> the plain tiff in excess of the $180_ per cab shown. on 
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exhibit "SSS". Since the plaintiff figured his cost on the 
installed and con1plete job it was proper for the court to 
receive and for the jury to consider a difference between 
the quoted price to the customer and the cost of Inater-
ials, labor and taxes as being the margin of the profit. 
Consider the following: 
Profits has been defined to be the ari thine-
tical excess of the price received over the total of 
all cost to the seller, and accordingly profits can-
not be computed until the total cost is deter-
mined. Hanley Co. v. Bradley, 259 N.Y.S. 279, 145 
Misc. 285. 
Profit is the acquisition beyond expenditure 
excess of value received for producing, keeping or 
selling over cost; hence pecuniary gain ·in any 
transaction or occupation; emolument. Mundy v. 
VanHoose, 30 S.E. 783, 104 Ga. 292. 
Profits as contained in an action for breach 
of contract stating measure of damages to be the 
loss of 'profits' occasioned by such breach; means 
the gain which would have been made if the con-
tract would have been complete. Hincley v. Pitts-
burgh Bessemer Steel Co., 7 S. Ct. 875, 121 U.S. 
264, 30 L. Ed. 967. 
The conclusion is warranted by the facts found. 
The accuracy of the plaintiff's figures were attacked 
by counsel before the- jury and also in their brief on 
appeal; however, the record discloses the honorable 
court made_certain that the figures set forth in exhibit 
"SSS" were accurate, not only were th.e items sub-
stantiated through the quotations received from sub-
contractors, but also the cost of the "crew day" and ma-
terials required for the job were explained by the plain-
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tiff's 1nana.ger through his personal experience on other 
elevator projects and his knowledge of the labor market. 
l\Ir. Connole very adequately showed that though the job 
was figured at a low marginal profit this was done to 
insure the prestige and advertisement the company would 
realize through the installation of its elevators at the 
Hotel Utah. 
It is to be recognized that if the plaintiff had gone 
ahead at the hotel in its own name and right that the 
item of profits could be more accurately set forth as a 
fact; ho,vever, since it was wrongful conduct and breach 
of contract on the part of the defendant that took the job 
away fron1 the plaintiff, the defendant is not in position 
to complain about the accuracy of proof of profit. S.ee 
Elsbach v. Mulligan, 58 Cal. App. 2d 354, 136 P. 2d 651; 
Natt'-"ral Soda Products v. City of Los Angeles, 143 P. 2d 
12, 23 Cal. 2d 193; Ziwn v. Ex-Cell-O Corporation, 149 P. 
2d 177, 24 Cal. 2d 290-; Steelduct Co. v. Henger-Seltzer 
Co., 26 Cal. 2d 634, 160 P. 2d 812. 
See also Hacker Pip,e & Supply Co. v. Chapman 
Val·re Ill anufacturing Co., 62 P. 2d 944, 17 Cal. App. 2d 
265, wherein the court stated: 
"It is well established that damages consisting 
of the loss of anticipated profits need not be es-
tablished with certainty. It is sufficient that it be 
shown as a reasonable probability that the profits 
would have been earned except for the breach of 
the contract. As stated in Pye v. Eagle Lake 
Lun1ber Co., 66 Cal. App. 584, 277 P. 193, 195, 
quoting from Kennett v. Katz Const. Co., 273 Mo. 
279, 202 S. W. 558, ' "While the actual amount 
of damages from the breach of a contract may not 
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be susceptible of exact proof, the la'v does not 
permit one whose act has resulted in loss to an-
other to escape liability on this account." * * * 
The law requires "only that the best evidence be 
adduced of which the nature of the case is cap-
able."' It is held generally that the breach of an 
exclusive sales agency contract through the inva-
sion of the territory of the agent (which is sub-
stantially the case in hand) will entitle the latter 
to the profits he would have made upon sales in 
the amount of those made by his principal in the 
invaded territory. Schiffman v. Peerless Motor 
Car Co., 13 Cal. App. 600, 110 P. 460, 462; Bred-
emeier v. Pacific Supply Co., 64 Or. 576, 131 P. 
312, 313. In ascertaining the a1nount of da1nage 
it is proper to assume that one who has an es-
tablished sales agency vvould have been able to 
conduct his business in the usual n1anner, except 
for the interference, and it is therefore proper to 
take into consideration, in estimating profits al-
leged to have been lost, the volume of business 
done in the past and the percentage of profit n1ade 
thereon. Schumann v. Karrer, 184 Cal. 50, 192 
P. 849; Yaguda v. niotion Picture Publications, 
Inc., 140 Cal. A pp. 195, 35 P. 2d 162; Erskine 
v. Marchant, 37 Cal. App. 590, 174 P. 74; Sanford 
v. East Riverside Irrigation District, 101 Cal. 275, 
35 P. 865; National Oil Refining & ~ffg. Co. v. 
Producers' Ref. Co., 169 Cal. 740, 147 P. 963." 
The same result is reached by the court in Gr'tt.pe 
v. Click, 26 Cal. 2d 680,160 P. 2d 840: 
"Upon this question, it is held that where 
the operation of an established business is pre-
vented or interrupted, as by a tort or breach of 
contract or warranty, damages for the loss of 
prospective profits that otherwise might have 
been made from its operation are generally re-
coverable for the reason that their occurrence and 
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extent 1nay be ascertained 'vith reasonable cer-
tainty from the past volume of business and 
other provable data relevant to the probable fu-
ture sales. (Overstreet v .. Merritt, 186 Cal. 494, 
200 P. 11 (breach of contract) and nu1nerous other 
cases.)" 
It has been said that "if a man make a better mouse-
trap than his neighbor - the world wi~l make a beaten 
track to his door," - but he must first tell the world 
that he has the mousetrap. This is the medium of adver-
tising. 
The plaintiff for more than twenty years had its 
nan1epla tes on the thresholds of the. cabs of the three 
pas~enger elevators at the Hotel Utah. This hotel is one 
of the very finest in the country. The plaintiff enjoyed 
this prestige, used a picture of the hotel on the cover of 
an advertising pan1phlet or company brochure, and the 
n1anager of the plaintiff stated that this had an advertis-
ing value ·of a.t least $30,000.00. An advertising expert 
testified that in his opinion the names of any company on 
the threshold of the three elevators would have a value 
of at least one thousand dollars per year. 
Counsel for appellant argue that the pl~ntiff could 
not sustain a loss in this respect since the hotel did not 
permit a na1ne on the threshold of the new cabs and, 
that even though ICi1nball had done the job and completed 
the modernization it "\vould be a misnomer for plaintiff's 
name to be there; and that such, if there, would amount 
to false advertising. 
This argun1ent runs squarely in the face of the es-
tablished and standard custom in the elevator industry. 
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Name plates are used not only in the state of Utah hut 
throughout the United States. Peculiarly nothing \vas 
said to Connole concerning either the use of nan1e plates 
or the re1noval of threshold nameplates. This "\Vas dis-
cussed between Jerry and R·oy Smith of the defendant 
con1pany; however, the discussion took place long after 
Septe1nber 27, 1950, when defendant breached its contract 
with plaintiff and severallnonths after the dispute arose 
bet-vveen the parties and the plain tiff had 1nade its de-
mands upon the defendant con1pany. If plaintiff had been 
awarded the contract and proceeded in continued good 
-vvill its na1ne would have been in- the lobby and at the 
entrance of each floor of the hotel - for at least a Inini-
mun1 of ten years and perhaps for twenty-five years. 
Its loss in this_ regard was obvious to the jury and the 
subject of its unani1nous verdict for the minimun1 ten 
years under the interest a1nortization schedule. The jury 
was certainly temperate in its decision. Counsel for ap-
pellant cannot reasonably show the verdict excessive. 
This element of damage could have been doubled. 
There is some confusion in the arguments raised by 
appellant concerning the legal right of the plain tiff to 
use its name where it has not actually produced all of the 
equipment making up the complete elevator. There does 
not seem to be any direct, in-point authority on this 
subject. Perhaps the situation of the elevator "manu-
facturer" or contractor is similar to the question of the 
right to use a "trade-name" as distinguished from a 
"trade 1nark". As explained by one of the witnesses, 
various trade marked articles may go into a co1nplete 
machine which will end up with a trade-name. 
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The following is set forth in 52 An1. J ur. 509: 
"The term 'trade na.1ne' is used in various 
senses. Thus, it has sometimes been used to indi-
cate a mark affixed to goods where such mark 
is not originally susceptible of exclusive appropri-
ation but has acquired a secondary meaning. It 
has also been used to indicate a part or all of a 
firn1 name or a partnership name. In its most 
common usage, it means a. name, word, or phrase 
en1ployed by one engaged in business, as a means 
of identifying his products, business or services, 
and of establishing good will. * * * A trade name 
also involves the individuality of the n1aker, for 
protection in trade, to avoid confusion in business, 
and to secure the advantages of a good reputation, 
and therefore it js said to have a broader scope 
than a trademark. It has also been declared that 
it is n1ore properly applied to the good will of the 
business. Therefore, while a trademark may con-
sist of a na1ne, a tradename as herein defined is 
not regarded as a traden1ark in the strict technical 
sense." 
and continuing the text 52 Ant. Jur. 513: 
"* * * A tradename is also said to be a species 
of property, and, while not strictly a trademark 
will as a general rule be protected in like manner. 
The theory of this is that a man may have ac-
. . 
quired a r.eputation for excellence in the manu-
facture or preparation of a certain article for sale, 
'vhich reputation 1nay be a source of profit to him 
in the enjoyment of which he ought to be pro-
tected." 
There can be no question concerning the value of 
advertising. American business and industry spends 
Inore for advertising media than any other country in the 
world. The plaintiff enjoyed the finest medium avail-
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able in its operating area and th.e jury was one hundred 
per cent correct in awarding plaintiff damages for loss 
of advertising and prestige. The verdict is legal and 
proper. 
Positi.ve Number Six: 
THE TRIAL WAS. FAIR 
The actual trial of this case ·ran for a number of 
days, interspersed with· continuations required by the 
regular district assignments of the trial judge. Conse-
quently the Court attempted to restrict evidence to the 
issues set by the pTe-trial order and by stipulations of 
counsel in meetings in ch.ambers. 
Counsel for appellant wanted to establish certain 
notariety among the elevator trade for defendant's repu-
tation as an independent or prime contractor by show-
ing direct bidding; however, after the consummation of 
several hours of trial time it was stipulated the Ele-
vator Supplies Company had quoted to elevator com-
panies other than plaintiff but that it had never been a 
prime contractor, not even for the installation of dumb 
waiters. The explanation of these issues by the trial 
judge, of which the defendant now so strongly co1nplains, 
could not have been prejudicial. 
From the very beginning of this lawsuit, plaintiff 
based its case on an implied agreement. Defendant de-
nied it had any agreement with the plaintiff, argued the 
reason for its denial and the non existence of such an inl-
plied agreement before the jury. The issue was one of 
fact. The jury found in favor of plaitiff. The facts are 
supported by the great preponderance of the evidence. 
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CONCLUSION 
The verdict of the jury is well founded by the record, 
and the evidence-both oral and documentary as set forth 
therein. The issues were outlined originally in plaintiff's 
complaint and it amended complaint, and through writ-
ten interrogatories and depositions prior to the trial 
of the cause. Plaintiff positively maintains that through 
a long course of business dealings with the defendant 
an implied agreement existed. The defendant had fair 
and unlimited opp·ortunity to set forth its denial and 
proof of the nonexistence of such an agreement. 
After both sides had offered its proof, issues were 
fully and finally presented through the instructions of 
the court. The findings and verdict were in favor of the 
plaintiff. Considering its loss of profit, and prestige 
over the years, the amount of the verdict awarded to 
the plaintiff is little compensation for its actual damages. 
Plaintiff requests that this Honorable Court uphold 
the action of the lower court and jury; and that plain-
tiff be awarded the judgment as entered and its costs 
as respondent on this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ANDREW JOHN BRENNAN, 
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